

# A Case Study in Abstract Testing

Verifying C String Manipulation

Nurit Dor and Michael Rodeh

<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~nurr>


Mooly Sagiv

# A Motivating Example

```
/* from web2c [strupascal.c] */  
void foo(char *s)  
{  
    while ( *s != ' ' )  
        s++;  
    *s = 0;  
}
```

# Unit Testing

```
void foo(char *s) {  
    while ( *s != ' ' )  
        s++;  
    *s = 0;  
}  
void main() {  
    char temp[]="hello world";  
    foo(temp);  
    printf("%s", temp);  
}
```



*hello*

# Abstract Testing

```
void foo(char *s)
```

```
{
```

```
    while ( *s != ' ' )
```

```
        s++;
```

```
    *s = 0;
```

```
}
```

Cleanness is potentially violated:  
 $\text{offset}(s) \geq \text{alloc}(\text{base}(s))$

```
void main() {
```

```
    char temp[]="hello-world";
```

```
    foo(temp);
```


```
    printf("%s", temp);
```

```
}
```

# Abstract Testing

```
void foo(char *s)
{
    while ( *s != ' ' && *s != 0)
        s++;
    *s = 0;
}
```

Cleanness is potentially violated:  
 $\text{offset}(s) \geq \text{alloc}(\text{base}(s))$



# Abstract Testing

```
void foo(char *s)
requires string(s)
{
    while ( *s != ' ' && *s != 0)
        s++;
    *s = 0;
}
```

No cleanness violation can occur👉

*Testing can only show the presence of errors*

# Plan

- ✓ Motivating example
- What is abstract testing (interpretation)
- CSSV: C Static String Verifier
  - Verifies cleanness of string manipulation
- Other abstract testing projects
  - 3VMC: 3 Valued Model Checker
    - Verifies Safety Properties in Concurrent Java Programs

# Collecting Testing Procedure

1. Explore all concrete states arising at each program point
2. Check precondition of every statement on all states

👍 *Sound: every safety violation is detected*

👍 *Complete: every bug reported is real*

👎 *Very expensive*

👎 *Usually does not terminate*

# Abstract Testing (Interpretation)

## Cousot and Cousot 1976

1. Explore all **abstract descriptions** of concrete states arising at each program point
2. **Conservatively** check precondition of every statement against **abstract description**
  - **Err on the safe side**

👍 *Guaranteed to terminate*

👍 *Can be made efficient*

👍 *Sound: every safety violation is detected*

👎 *Incomplete: May produce false alarms*

# Even/Odd Abstract Testing

- Determine if an integer variable is even or odd at a given program point

# Example Program

```
/* x=? */
```

```
while (x !=1) do { /* x=? */
```

```
    if (x %2) == 0
```

```
    /* x=E */          { x := x / 2; }          /* x=? */
```


```
    else
```

```
    /* x=O */          { x := x * 3 + 1;          /* x=E */  
                        assert (x %2 ==0); }
```


```
}
```

```
/* x=? */
```


# Abstract Interpretation




# Odd/Even Abstract Interpretation



# Odd/Even Abstract Interpretation




# Odd/Even Abstract Interpretation



# Example Program

```
while (x !=1) do {  
    if (x %2) == 0  
        { x := x / 2; }  
    else  
        /* x=O */ { x := x * 3 + 1;    /* x=E */  
                    assert (x %2 ==0); }  
}
```

# (Best) Abstract Transformer



# Concrete and Abstract Interpretation

+	0	1	2	3	...
0	0	1	2	3	...
1	1	2	3	4	...
2	2	3	4	5	...
3	3	4	5	6	...
□	□	□	□	□	

*	0	1	2	3	...
0	0	0	0	0	...
1	0	1	2	3	...
2	0	2	4	6	...
3	0	3	6	9	...
□	□	□	□	□	

+'	?	O	E
?	?	?	?
O	?	E	O
E	?	O	E

*'	?	O	E
?	?	?	E
O	?	O	E
E	E	E	E

# Challenges in Abstract Testing

- Finding appropriate program semantics (runtime)
- Designing abstract representations
  - What to forget
  - What to remember
    - Summarize crucial information
  - Handling loops
  - Handling procedures
- Scalability
  - Large programs
  - Missing source code
- Minimal false alarms

# Runtime vs. Abstract Testing

	Runtime	Abstract
Effectiveness	Missed Errors	False alarms
		Locate rare errors
Cost	Proportional to program's execution	Proportional to program's size

# CSSV Goals


- Check cleanness
  - “Undefined ANSI-C semantics”
- Verify absence of
  - Out of bound references
  - Unsafe pointer arithmetic
  - References beyond null termination
  - Unsafe library calls

# Standard C Semantics

$p_1 = \text{calloc}(10);$

$p_2 = p_1 + i;$


$p_3 = *p_2;$



# Instrumented Semantics

*Shadow memory*

*base size offset*



# CSSV's Abstraction


- Ignore
  - Memory Addresses
  - Actual pointer values
- *Dynamic Size*
- *Dynamic Offsets*
- Track
  - Allocation sites
  - Which pointer may point to memory addresses (allocation sites)
- *Fixed sizes*
- *Fixed offsets*
- *Fixed index variables*
- *Integer Relationships between offsets, sizes, and integer variables*

# Abstract Semantics

$ll: p_1 = \text{calloc}(m);$

$p_2 = p_1 + i;$

$p_3 = *p_2;$



# Scalability

- Cheap whole program pointer analysis
  - Flow insensitive
- Use modular analysis

# Procedure Calls – Contracts

`char* strcpy(char* dst, char *src)`

**requires** ( `string(src) ^`  
`alloc(dst) > len(src)`  
)

**mod** `len(dst), is_nullt(dst)`

**ensures** ( `len(dst) == pre@len(src) ^`  
`return == pre@dst`  
)

# Contracts – insert\_long()

```
/* insert_long.c */
#include "insert_long.h"
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char * insert_long (char *cp) {
    char temp[BUFSIZ];
    int i;
    for (i=0; &buf[i] < cp; ++i){
        temp[i] = buf[i];
    }
    strcpy (&temp[i],"(long)");
    strcpy (&temp[i + 6], cp);
    strcpy (buf, temp);
    return cp + 6;
}
```

```
char * insert_long(char *cp)
    requires( string(cp) ^
                buf ≤ cp < buf + BUFSIZ
            )
    mod cp.strlen
    ensures (
        len(cp) == pre[len(cp) + 6]
            ^
        return_value == cp + 6 ;
    )
```

# Abstract Testing insert\_long()

---

```
/* from web2c [fixwrites.c] */
```

```
#define BUFSIZ 1024
```

```
char buf[BUFSIZ];
```

```
char insert_long(char *cp)  
{
```

```
    char temp[BUFSIZ];
```

```
    ...
```


```
    for (i = 0; &buf[i] < cp ; ++i)
```

```
        temp[i] = buf[i];
```

```
    strcpy(&temp[i], "(long)");
```

```
    strcpy(&temp[i+6], cp);
```

```
    ...
```



# Abstract Testing insert\_long()

```
/* from web2c [fixwrites.c] */
```

```
#define BUFSIZ 1024
```

```
char buf[BUFSIZ];
```

```
char insert_long(char *cp)  
{
```

```
    char temp[BUFSIZ];
```

```
    ...
```


```
    for (i = 0; &buf[i] < cp ; ++i)
```

```
        temp[i] = buf[i];
```

```
    strcpy(&temp[i], "(long)");
```

```
    strcpy(&temp[i+6], cp);
```

```
    ...
```



Cleanness is potentially violated:

$$7 + \text{offset}(cp) \geq \text{BUFSIZ}$$

# Abstract Testing insert\_long()

```
/* from web2c [fixwrites.c] */
```

```
#define BUFSIZ 1024
```

```
char buf[BUFSIZ];
```

```
char insert_long(char *cp)  
{
```

```
    char temp[BUFSIZ];
```

```
    ...
```


```
    for (i = 0; &buf[i] < cp ; ++i)
```

```
        temp[i] = buf[i];
```

```
    strcpy(&temp[i], "(long)");
```

```
    strcpy(&temp[i+6], cp);
```

```
    ...
```



Cleanness is potentially violated:

$\text{offset}(cp) + 7 + \text{len}(cp) \geq \text{BUFSIZ}$

$7 + \text{offset}(cp) < \text{BUFSIZ}$


# Advantages of Procedure Contracts

- Modular analysis
  - Not all the code is available
  - Enables more expensive analyses
- User control of the verification
  - Detect errors at point of logical error
  - Improve the precision of the analysis
  - Check additional properties
    - Beyond ANSI-C

# Specification and Soundness

- All errors are detected
- Violation of procedure's precondition
  - Call
- Violation of procedure's postcondition
  - Return
- Violation of statement's precondition
  - ...a[i]...
- But what about false alarms?

# CSSV – Technical overview



# Implementation

- Handles full C
- Using:
  - ASToolKit [Microsoft]
  - GOLF [Microsoft – Manuvir Das]
  - New Polka [IMAG - Bertrand Jeannet]
- Main steps:
  - Simplifier (Greta Yorsh)
  - Pointer analysis
  - C2IP
  - Integer Analysis

# Empirical Results

- Verified string library from Airbus with 6 false alarms
- Found 8 errors in another string intensive application with 2 false alarms

# Other Abstract Testing Projects

- Polyspace
  - Compliance with ANSI C
- Absint
  - Worst case execution time
  - Memory consumption
- Microsoft Research
  - ESP
  - SLAM
  - Vault
  - Behave
- Berkley
  - CCURE
  - Cqual
- TAU
  - 3VMC Eran Yahav
    - POPL 01
    - ESOP 03

# 3VMC Goals

- Verification of concurrent Java programs
- Support the following
  - Interleaving concurrency-model
  - Dynamic allocation/deallocation of objects
  - Dynamic allocation/deallocation of threads

# Java Concurrency

- *Threads and locks are just dynamically allocated objects*
- *synchronized* implements mutual exclusion
- *wait, notify* and *notifyAll* coordinate activities across threads

# Java Concurrency Challenges

- Dynamic allocation
- Data and control are strongly related
  - Thread-scheduling info may require understanding of heap structure (e.g., scheduling queue)
  - Heap analysis requires information on thread scheduling

```
Thread t1 = new Thread();  
Thread t2 = new Thread();  
...  
if (...) t = t1 else t = t2;  
t.start();
```

# Example - Mutual Exclusion

```
l_0: while (true) {  
l_1:     synchronized(sharedLock) {  
l_c:     // critical actions  
l_2:     }  
l_3: }
```

Two threads:  $(pc_1, pc_2, lockAcquired_1, lockAcquired_2)$

- Allocate new lock ?
- Allocate new thread ?


# Configurations

- A program configuration encodes:
  - global store
  - program-location of every thread
  - status of locks and threads
- First-order logical structures used to represent program configurations
- Operational semantics expressed using Formulas
  - Interleaving model of concurrency

# Configurations

- Predicates model properties of interest
  - `is_thread(t)`
  - `{ at[lab](t) : lab ∈ Labels }`
  - `{ rval[fld](o1,o2) : fld ∈ Fields }`
  - `held_by(l,t)`
  - `blocked(t,l)`
  - `waiting(t,l)`
- Can use the framework with different predicates

# Concrete Configurations




# Configurations

- Program control-flow is not separately represented
- Program location for each thread is encoded inside the configuration
  - $\{ \text{at}[\text{lab}](t) : \text{lab} \in \text{Labels} \}$


# Abstract Configurations

- First-order 3-valued logical structures are used to represent abstract program configurations
- 3-valued logic
  - 1 = true
  - 0 = false
  - $1/2$  = unknown
  - A join semi-lattice,  $0 \sqcup 1 = 1/2$

# Concrete Configuration



# Abstract Configuration




# Canonic Abstraction

- Merge all nodes with the same unary predicate values into a single summary node
- Join predicate values
- Convert a configuration of arbitrary size into a 3-valued abstract configuration of bounded size



# Unbounded Number of Threads

- Exploit state-space symmetry
- Previous work defined symmetry between process names (indices)
- Thread location = thread property
- Canonic names = symmetry between properties
- Anonymous thread names


# Abstract Transformers





# Concretization




# After Action



# After Abstraction




# Example - Mutual Exclusion




Initial configuration

# Example - Mutual Exclusion



A thread enters the critical section

# Example - Mutual Exclusion



Other threads may be blocked or just beginning execution

# Safety Properties Revisited

- RW interference
- WW interference
- Total deadlock
- Nested monitors
- Illegal thread interactions

# Prototype Implementation

- 3VMC (TVLA)
- Used to verify several small example programs
  - The apprentice challenge [Moore]
  - concurrent stack
  - queue
  - two-lock queue [PODC96]
  - dining philosophers

# Conclusion

- 👍 Ambitious sound analyses
  - Appropriate operational semantics
  - Powerful abstractions
- 👍 Very few false alarms
- ◇ Scaling is an issue
  - staged analyses
  - modular analysis
  - encapsulation
  - property-guided